Cyber and pre-positioning
Officials describe hostile state hackers placing themselves inside U.S. networks, for use in a future crisis or conflict. That is a statement of capability and intent, not of a planned date.
“China’s hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities. If or when China decides the time has come to strike, they’re not focused solely on political or military targets.”
Christopher Wray, then FBI DirectorJan 31, 2024
FBI, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPConditional: “If or when.” The committee’s transcript renders the spoken words as “if and when”; we use the FBI’s published text.“This threat is not theoretical… And what we’ve found to date is likely the tip of the iceberg.”
Jen Easterly, then CISA DirectorJan 31, 2024
CISA, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPThe ellipsis omits a short passage. “Likely” is hers.“Chinese cyber actors, including a group known as ‘Volt Typhoon,’ are burrowing deep into our critical infrastructure to be ready to launch destructive cyber-attacks in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”
Jen Easterly, then CISA DirectorJan 31, 2024
CISA, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPConditional: “in the event of a major crisis or conflict.”“PRC cyber actors are almost certainly capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.”
Jen Easterly, then CISA DirectorJan 31, 2024
Written testimony, House Select Committee on the CCP (PDF)A statement of capability (“almost certainly capable,” “could”), not a prediction.“The authoring agencies recognize the reality that the PRC has already compromised these systems. In some cases, the cyber actors have been living inside IT networks for years to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against operational technology (OT) in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”
National Security Agency, with CISA and FBIFeb 7, 2024
NSA press releaseConditional: “in the event of a major crisis or conflict.” The companion advisory (AA24-038A) says Volt Typhoon kept access in some victim IT environments “for at least five years.”“…assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable lateral movement to OT assets to disrupt functions.”
CISA, NSA and FBI, joint advisory AA24-038AFeb 7, 2024
CISA advisory AA24-038A“Federal departments and agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves to disrupt critical infrastructure operations in the event of geopolitical tensions and/or military conflicts.”
Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, and Michael Regan, EPA AdministratorMar 18, 2024
Letter to all U.S. governors (PDF)Conditional: “in the event of.”“The U.S. government’s continued investigation into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) targeting of commercial telecommunications infrastructure has revealed a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.”
FBI and CISA, joint statement on Salt TyphoonNov 13, 2024
CISAEspionage, not an outage. The statement says the private communications compromised were of “a limited number of individuals” primarily in government or political activity.“These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.”
CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners (AA25-239A)Aug 27, 2025
CISA advisory AA25-239AAbout PRC state-sponsored actors, overlapping with Salt Typhoon.“The PRC continues its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States.”
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2025 Homeland Threat AssessmentOct 2, 2024
DHS Homeland Threat Assessment 2025 (PDF)Conditional: “potential,” “in the event of a conflict.” This is the newest edition DHS has published.“These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets.”
U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat AssessmentMar 2026
ODNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (PDF)The report also says “we should be cautious about thinking that every problem in the world directly threatens us or is of equal importance to the U.S.”“…state and nonstate actors have the capability to directly strike the Homeland.”
U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (Foreword)Mar 2026
ODNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (PDF)A statement of capability. The same foreword says the U.S. maintains “a powerful and capable military.”“They have been used by Chinese state-sponsored actors Volt Typhoon to pre-position offensive cyber capabilities on critical national infrastructure.”
CISA and partners (AA26-113a)Apr 23, 2026
CISA advisory AA26-113a“They” are covert networks of compromised devices.“Chinese government-affiliated actors continue to position themselves within critical infrastructure networks, including operational technology (OT) systems, with the aim of disrupting critical functions at a future time of their choosing.”
Chris Butera, Acting Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, CISAOct 8, 2026
CISA“The threat landscape is evolving at an unprecedented pace. Nation-state actors and other malicious adversaries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to compromise U.S. networks.”
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security AgencyOct 26, 2026
CISA 2030 strategy release“Other adversaries—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and Russia—remain active in cyber espionage, in enabling ransomware, and in pre-positioning on U.S. critical infrastructure for use in a future crisis or conflict.”
Christopher Raia, Deputy Director, FBINov 18, 2026
Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)Written testimony (a primary document). This is about cyber activity, and it is separate from the Nov 2026 outages.“Cyber actors affiliated with America’s near-peer adversaries retain the capabilities to pose a severe cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure. They seek disruptive attacks against energy, water, telecommunications, transportation, and other critical networks.”
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland SecurityNov 18, 2026
Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)Written testimony. “Retain the capabilities” and “seek” describe capability and intent.