The evidence

What officials have said, in their own words.

These are risk and capability statements, not a prediction. They explain why we built a plan for the everyday systems pausing, whatever the cause. Every line is quoted from the linked document, and none gives a date or says an attack is certain.

Not an attack, as far as officials can tell.

The outages this month (the Nov 13 FAA ground stop, Chase on Nov 16, and several others) were not, as far as officials have said, cyberattacks. On Nov 18, 2026 the Director of National Intelligence told the House Homeland Security Committee: “These are separate service outages associated with maintenance and technical changes. They are not a coordinated or state-sponsored attack.” The FBI’s Deputy Director said there was no indication of malicious cyber activity behind them. That is why we say whatever the cause. Nothing on this page is about those outages. These hearing quotes are as reported by CBS News. We are checking them against the transcript.

Timeline: May 2021 to Nov 2026

17 dated statements, one line each, oldest first. Read in order, the wording becomes more specific over five years. That is an observation about the language, not a forecast.

  1. President Biden, Executive Order 14028
    “The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people's security and privacy.”
    Federal RegisterSigned five days after the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.
  2. Jen Easterly, CISA Director, and Tom Fanning, Southern Company
    “This was the moment when the vulnerability of our highly connected society became a nationwide reality and a kitchen table issue.”
    CISA blogLooking back at the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.
  3. Christopher Wray, then FBI Director
    “China's hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities. If or when China decides the time has come to strike, they're not focused solely on political or military targets.”
    FBI, House Select Committee on the CCP
  4. National Security Agency, with CISA and FBI
    “The authoring agencies recognize the reality that the PRC has already compromised these systems. In some cases, the cyber actors have been living inside IT networks for years to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against operational technology (OT) in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”
    NSA press releaseThe joint advisory (AA24-038A) adds that Volt Typhoon kept access in some victim IT environments for at least five years.
  5. Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, and Michael Regan, EPA Administrator
    “Disabling cyberattacks are striking water and wastewater systems throughout the United States.”
    Letter to all U.S. governors
  6. FBI and CISA, joint statement
    “The U.S. government's continued investigation into the People's Republic of China (PRC) targeting of commercial telecommunications infrastructure has revealed a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.”
    CISA
  7. U.S. Department of the Treasury, letter to the Senate Banking Committee
    “Based on available indicators, the incident has been attributed to a China state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor.”
    Treasury letter (PDF)About the December 2024 Treasury breach through a vendor's remote-support service. Treasury reported no evidence of continuing access.
  8. Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General, GAO
    “State and non-state actors are attacking our government and private sector systems thousands of times each day.”
    GAO statement to House Oversight (PDF)GAO also says the government is not yet operating at a pace commensurate with these threats.
  9. U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command, 2024 CTIME report
    “...extensive analysis conducted by Coast Guard Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) has revealed vulnerabilities that could enable a malicious cyber actor the ability to disrupt port operations.”
    Coast Guard CTIME 2024 report (PDF)About China-made ship-to-shore cranes. The report also says Coast Guard teams have not observed active malicious cyber activity on these crane systems.
  10. CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners
    “These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.”
    CISA advisory AA25-239AAbout PRC state-sponsored actors targeting telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging and military networks (Salt Typhoon overlap).
  11. U.S. Intelligence Community, Annual Threat Assessment
    “These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets.”
    ODNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment
  12. Kash Patel, FBI Director
    “Today we announced the disruption of a global botnet and hacking platform used by Chinese state-sponsored hackers to target U.S. critical infrastructure.”
    Justice DepartmentLed by FBI San Diego. Agencies named in the release are "among the targets," not confirmed breaches.
  13. Chris Butera, Acting Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, CISA
    “Chinese government-affiliated actors continue to position themselves within critical infrastructure networks, including operational technology (OT) systems, with the aim of disrupting critical functions at a future time of their choosing.”
    CISA
  14. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
    “The threat landscape is evolving at an unprecedented pace. Nation-state actors and other malicious adversaries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to compromise U.S. networks.”
    CISA 2030 strategy release
  15. Chris Butera, CISA (joint with FBI, HHS, USDA, DOT)
    “Every organization that depends on refrigeration and monitoring systems should assume it could be a target.”
    CISAAbout food and medicine cold-chain controls. The warning is about malicious actors globally, not a named country.
  16. Federal Reserve Board, Financial Stability Report
    “Cyberattacks and other cyber events could disrupt market functioning and the provision of financial services.”
    Federal Reserve (PDF)Listed as a potential near-term risk, not a prediction.
  17. Christopher Raia, Deputy Director, FBI
    “Other adversaries—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, and Russia—remain active in cyber espionage, in enabling ransomware, and in pre-positioning on U.S. critical infrastructure for use in a future crisis or conflict.”
    Written testimony to House Homeland Security (PDF)

Grid and infrastructure

How strained the power grid is, and what officials say about the systems everyday life depends on.

“…the overall situation remains highly concerning and continues to merit a ‘five-alarm fire’ response.”

Jim Robb, President and CEO, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)Oct 21, 2026

Opening statement, FERC Reliability Technical Conference (PDF)About the strain on the grid overall, not a single threat. In the same statement: “By most objective measures, the BPS remains extraordinarily reliable.”
“Overlaying all of this is the ever-present and constantly evolving threat landscape related to cybersecurity and physical security.”

Kal Ayoub, Director, Office of Electric Reliability, FERCApr 15, 2026

Written testimony, Senate Energy Subcommittee (PDF)
“The U.S. grid's distribution systems—which carry electricity from transmission systems to consumers and are regulated primarily by states—are increasingly at risk from cyberattacks.”

Government Accountability Office (GAO-21-81)Mar 18, 2021

GAO report pageThe same report says the scale of potential impacts from such attacks “is not well understood.” GAO lists its recommendation as still open as of March 2026.
“…the electricity grid is an attractive target for cyberattacks from U.S. adversaries—such as nations like China and Russia, as well as individual bad actors, such as insiders and criminals.”

Government Accountability OfficeOct 12, 2022

GAO WatchBlogA 2022 blog post, so older than most items here.
“There has been far too little public focus on the fact that PRC [People’s Republic of China] hackers are targeting our critical infrastructure—our water treatment plants, our electrical grid, our oil and natural gas pipelines, our transportation systems—and the risk that poses to every American requires our attention now.”

Christopher Wray, then FBI DirectorJan 31, 2024

FBI, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPThe bracketed words appear in the FBI’s published text.

Cyber and pre-positioning

Officials describe hostile state hackers placing themselves inside U.S. networks, for use in a future crisis or conflict. That is a statement of capability and intent, not of a planned date.

“China’s hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities. If or when China decides the time has come to strike, they’re not focused solely on political or military targets.”

Christopher Wray, then FBI DirectorJan 31, 2024

FBI, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPConditional: “If or when.” The committee’s transcript renders the spoken words as “if and when”; we use the FBI’s published text.
“Chinese cyber actors, including a group known as ‘Volt Typhoon,’ are burrowing deep into our critical infrastructure to be ready to launch destructive cyber-attacks in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”

Jen Easterly, then CISA DirectorJan 31, 2024

CISA, opening statement to the House Select Committee on the CCPConditional: “in the event of a major crisis or conflict.”
“PRC cyber actors are almost certainly capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.”

Jen Easterly, then CISA DirectorJan 31, 2024

Written testimony, House Select Committee on the CCP (PDF)A statement of capability (“almost certainly capable,” “could”), not a prediction.
“The authoring agencies recognize the reality that the PRC has already compromised these systems. In some cases, the cyber actors have been living inside IT networks for years to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against operational technology (OT) in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”

National Security Agency, with CISA and FBIFeb 7, 2024

NSA press releaseConditional: “in the event of a major crisis or conflict.” The companion advisory (AA24-038A) says Volt Typhoon kept access in some victim IT environments “for at least five years.”
“…assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable lateral movement to OT assets to disrupt functions.”

CISA, NSA and FBI, joint advisory AA24-038AFeb 7, 2024

CISA advisory AA24-038A
“Federal departments and agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves to disrupt critical infrastructure operations in the event of geopolitical tensions and/or military conflicts.”

Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, and Michael Regan, EPA AdministratorMar 18, 2024

Letter to all U.S. governors (PDF)Conditional: “in the event of.”
“The U.S. government’s continued investigation into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) targeting of commercial telecommunications infrastructure has revealed a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.”

FBI and CISA, joint statement on Salt TyphoonNov 13, 2024

CISAEspionage, not an outage. The statement says the private communications compromised were of “a limited number of individuals” primarily in government or political activity.
“These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.”

CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners (AA25-239A)Aug 27, 2025

CISA advisory AA25-239AAbout PRC state-sponsored actors, overlapping with Salt Typhoon.
“The PRC continues its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States.”

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2025 Homeland Threat AssessmentOct 2, 2024

DHS Homeland Threat Assessment 2025 (PDF)Conditional: “potential,” “in the event of a conflict.” This is the newest edition DHS has published.
“These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets.”

U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat AssessmentMar 2026

ODNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (PDF)The report also says “we should be cautious about thinking that every problem in the world directly threatens us or is of equal importance to the U.S.”
“…state and nonstate actors have the capability to directly strike the Homeland.”

U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (Foreword)Mar 2026

ODNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (PDF)A statement of capability. The same foreword says the U.S. maintains “a powerful and capable military.”
“They have been used by Chinese state-sponsored actors Volt Typhoon to pre-position offensive cyber capabilities on critical national infrastructure.”

CISA and partners (AA26-113a)Apr 23, 2026

CISA advisory AA26-113a“They” are covert networks of compromised devices.
“Chinese government-affiliated actors continue to position themselves within critical infrastructure networks, including operational technology (OT) systems, with the aim of disrupting critical functions at a future time of their choosing.”

Chris Butera, Acting Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, CISAOct 8, 2026

CISA
“The threat landscape is evolving at an unprecedented pace. Nation-state actors and other malicious adversaries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to compromise U.S. networks.”

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security AgencyOct 26, 2026

CISA 2030 strategy release
“Other adversaries—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and Russia—remain active in cyber espionage, in enabling ransomware, and in pre-positioning on U.S. critical infrastructure for use in a future crisis or conflict.”

Christopher Raia, Deputy Director, FBINov 18, 2026

Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)Written testimony (a primary document). This is about cyber activity, and it is separate from the Nov 2026 outages.
“Cyber actors affiliated with America’s near-peer adversaries retain the capabilities to pose a severe cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure. They seek disruptive attacks against energy, water, telecommunications, transportation, and other critical networks.”

Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland SecurityNov 18, 2026

Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)Written testimony. “Retain the capabilities” and “seek” describe capability and intent.

Financial system

Banks, payments and markets: what the Fed, Treasury and the FBI have said.

“Cyberattacks and other cyber events could disrupt market functioning and the provision of financial services.”

Federal Reserve Board, Financial Stability ReportNov 13, 2026

Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report (PDF)Listed as a potential near-term risk, not a prediction. The report otherwise calls the system fairly stable and names no state actor or incident.
“…a cyber event at a financial institution that impedes its ability to provide services could have wide-ranging effects, including degraded market liquidity, erosion of investor and depositor confidence, and forced sales of assets.”

Federal Reserve Board, Financial Stability ReportNov 13, 2026

Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report (PDF)Conditional: “could.”
“Second, the Council is taking action to protect our financial system from increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks. Nation-state actors and criminal groups continue to target our financial institutions and critical infrastructure.”

Scott Bessent, Treasury Secretary, for the Financial Stability Oversight CouncilFeb 4, 2026

Written statement to the House Financial Services Committee (Treasury)
“Based on available indicators, the incident has been attributed to a China state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor.”

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Aditi Hardikar, Assistant Secretary for Management)Dec 30, 2024

Letter to the Senate Banking Committee (PDF, hosted by Nextgov)About a December 2024 breach of Treasury through a third-party remote-support vendor. Treasury reported no evidence of continuing access.
“ARTEX is an open-source, large language model (LLM)-driven agentic platform that threat actors have weaponized to automate multiple phases of cyber intrusions at machine speed, from reconnaissance through data exfiltration.”

FBI, FLASH-20261113-001Nov 13, 2026

FBI FLASH (PDF)The FLASH refers to “a variety of malicious cyber actors” and does not attribute ARTEX use to China. The banks it describes were South Korean and the motive was financial.
“Ordinary Americans feel it directly through identity theft, hijacked accounts, business email compromise, and cyberstalking. In 2025 alone, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received over one million complaints and overall cybercrime losses of nearly $21 billion.”

Christopher Raia, Deputy Director, FBINov 18, 2026

Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)This is about everyday crime against families, not state attacks or outages.

Water, food and cold chain

The everyday lifelines: drinking water, refrigeration and food and medicine storage.

“Disabling cyberattacks are striking water and wastewater systems throughout the United States. These attacks have the potential to disrupt the critical lifeline of clean and safe drinking water…”

Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, and Michael Regan, EPA AdministratorMar 18, 2024

Letter to all U.S. governors (PDF)“Have the potential to disrupt.” The letter does not say any city’s water was cut off.
“Every organization that depends on refrigeration and monitoring systems should assume it could be a target.”

Chris Butera, Acting Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, CISANov 5, 2026

CISA, FBI, HHS, USDA and DOT joint releaseThe release is about malicious actors “globally.” It does not name China or any state.
“Industrial refrigeration and cold-chain monitoring systems protect food, medicine, and other temperature-sensitive products, making them attractive targets for malicious cyber actors.”

Brett Leatherman, FBI Cyber Branch Operations DirectorNov 5, 2026

CISA, FBI, HHS, USDA and DOT joint releaseSame release; not attributed to a state.
“In addition to national security and intellectual property, systems supporting daily life of the American people are at risk, including safe water, ample supply of energy, reliable and secure telecommunications, and our financial services.”

Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, GAOFeb 25, 2025

GAO statement to the House Oversight Committee (PDF)GAO’s High-Risk List has included federal cybersecurity since 1997.

Ports and supply chain

Shipping, cargo and the systems that move goods.

“…extensive analysis conducted by Coast Guard Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) has revealed vulnerabilities that could enable a malicious cyber actor the ability to disrupt port operations.”

U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command, 2024 CTIME reportMay 19, 2025

Coast Guard CTIME 2024 report (PDF)About China-made ship-to-shore cranes. The report also says “Coast Guard CPTs have not observed any active malicious cyber activity (MCA) on these crane systems.”
“Hostile nation-states are aiding and utilizing these illicit organizations as force multipliers in their efforts to target U.S. infrastructure, supply chains, technology, economic competitiveness, and American citizens.”

Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland SecurityNov 18, 2026

Written testimony, House Homeland Security Committee (PDF)“Illicit organizations” here are criminal groups. Written testimony.
“…Volt Typhoon has compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organizations—primarily in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors…”

CISA, NSA and FBI, joint advisory AA24-038AFeb 7, 2024

CISA advisory AA24-038AIT environments, not operational systems: the advisory describes access and footholds, not an outage.
“We still don’t actually know what the result of that is going to be... They are in those systems.”

Steve Casapulla, Acting Chief Strategy Officer, CISAJul 31, 2025

CyberScoop report of a CISA eventReported by CyberScoop, not a CISA document. He says plainly that the intent is not known, and he posed the port scenarios as questions.

How we checked

  • Verbatim. Every quotation is copied word for word from the linked document. An ellipsis (…) marks cut words, and we only cut where the meaning stays the same. Square brackets in a quote are the source’s own.
  • Linked. Each item links to the original: a government page, a hearing statement, an official letter or a published report. A few sit on a copy hosted elsewhere; the label says so.
  • Checked. We read each quote in the source on Nov 18, 2026. We keep conditionals (“could,” “in the event of,” “if or when”) and we show the caveat beside the quote.
  • Limits. This is not a complete record, and it is not a prediction. We left out commentators, opinion and media reports, except where a line is marked as reported. Two hearing quotes about the recent outages are press-reported and still being checked.

Whatever the cause, when the everyday systems pause, would your family know what to do?

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